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In 1993–1995 restricted and more transparent forms of income redistri-
bution replaced theextensive and hidden redistribution under thecommand
economy. Macroeconomic data on the Czech Republic show a very slow de-
crease in the rate of redistribution (the so-called consolidated tax quota)
from the early 1990s to 2002, but a slight increase since then (currently at
38 percent of GDP, slightly below the average of European OECD coun-
tries). It is certainly not enough to speak only of averages and aggregates.
It is important at the same time to show the redistributive flows and the so-
cial identities of taxpayers and benefit recipients. The question is how taxes
and benefits interact in shaping household income, and what the net effect
of redistribution is.
The attention paid to income redistribution has remained disproportiona-
tely low in the Czech Republic compared to Western countries. For instance,
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), based in London, publishes regular,
extensive reports on tax reforms and their impact on both public and house-
hold finances (see the series The IFS Green Budget). Despite the efforts pur-
sued by IFS researchers in the early 1990s in joint Czech-British projects
on taxation, no comprehensive analysis has ever been attempted in
the Czech Republic.1 Nevertheless, important research on the issue does 
exist and has been published regularly in Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal
of Economics and Finance.2
Since 2003 the issue of tax reform has been surfacing as a hot political
issue. In debates, a typological (model families) approach and examples are
applied, instead of utilizing a representative sample of the population. In
research, only Ondﬁej Schneider has calculated the total effect of all taxes
(both direct and indirect) and transfers on the distribution of income, us-
* This research was supported by the grant of the Global Development Network (GDN) No. RRC
V-37 titled “How the labor market and earnings affect family income. Disparities in market
income and household disposable income in the Czech Republic between 1988 and 2002”.
** Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences (Jiri.Vecernik@soc.cas.cz)
1 See ACE/PHARE Grants “Taxation and the Transition to a Market Economy in Czechoslo-
vakia” (1992–1993) and “Tax Policy during Economic Transition” (1994–1995), both coordinated
by Stephen Smith, IFS Deputy Director at the time.
2 See the thematic issues of Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance focus-
ing on redistribution (under the guest editorship of this author) 12/2001 and 1/2002. (Articles
available on the address: www.financeauver.org.)ing the Family Expenditures Surveys (FES). FES is the only source where
taxes levied on consumption can be computed together with direct taxes
and social benefits (Schneider – Jelínek, 2001, 2005).
In a continuation of our previous research we use here income surveys (Mi-
crocensus) to show the joint effect of taxes and transfers on the distribution
of household income. The paper is organized as follows: In the first part,
data, samples and indicators are presented and explained. In the second
part, data on Czech employee households are used to analyze the change in
redistribution and therelevant factors for theperiod between 1988 and 2002.
In thethird part, theCzech Republic is compared with other OECD/EU coun-
tries in terms of redistributive flows. In the fourth part, several recent re-
form proposals for the distribution of income are tested.
1. Data, Samples and Indicators
The paper draws on data sets from income surveys conducted in 1988,
1996 and 2002. The advantages of income surveys are their considerable
size and their representativity, but one disadvantage is in their infrequency.
The original four-year interim has not been repeated since 1996. Another
disadvantage is that information on taxes and certain social benefits is not
solicited from households or collected from official bodies. Instead, the in-
formation is imputed by statisticians using data on household income and
composition. This kind of information is important if one is seeking to exa-
mine the system, but it is less relevant for an assessment of how it func-
tions in society.
Collecting household-income data is much more complicated for the pe-
riod after 1989 than before. Under the command regime, the refusal rate
for participation in surveys was low, because even if a survey was not ex-
pressly designated as compulsory, people were afraid to refuse to comply
with any official enquiry. In particular, the most important sources of in-
come were directly transferred by the state administration – the wages of
individual workers were passed on by their employers and pension bene-
fits were reported by the post offices that distributed them. Consequently,
income surveys were very reliable with regard to formal income sources and
the visible part of redistribution.
Since 1989, all income data have been self-reported, if not imputed by
statisticians. Unlike the previous situation, where the only income-provider
was the state and the structure was quite simple, there are now countless
actors and entities that function as sources of income. Since 1990, the share
of earnings from state-dependent activities has decreased, while the share
of income from self-employment and entrepreneurship has been rising. In-
stead of uniformity, we are now presented with a wider variety of economic
statuses and also their combinations, such as a mixture of dependent full-
-time employment and independent part-time employment.
The growing obstacles to income inspection is illustrated in the three in-
come surveys cited here (Table 1). The coverage of surveyed income in com-
parison with the calculations of National Accounts has decreased substan-
tially, despite corrections made by statisticians after the collection of data.
However, such problems are quite common in income surveys.3 Neverthe-
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Statistical Office constitute the best, if not the only, representative source
of information on household incomes in this country.
Information on income, taxes and benefits is never fully reliable. In
income surveys, taxes are often imputed by statisticians using incomes
reported by respondents as a base – this is also the case of Czech income
surveys. However, in reality, many business-license holders attempt to
“optimize” their taxes by under-reporting income and inflating expenses.
This behaviour is indicated in aggregate tax data, according to which
contributions to social and health insurance paid by employees are about
three times higher than contributions from the self-employed (Pelc,
2000).
Evidence relating to social benefits is better, as the figures for social be-
nefits are usually imputed according to entitlements derived from the com-
position and economic situation of a household. There are, however, other
factors which distort the information: on the one hand there is the fraudu-
lent receipt of benefits, and on the other the non-take-up of benefits. In
a Czech survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM),
close to one-third of low-income households report that they do not know
how to seek individual benefits. While payments of child benefits exceed
90 percent of entitlements, payments of social contributions and housing
contributions have much lower shares (Mare‰, 2001).
For the cross-time comparison presented in the second section of the pa-
per, only households of non-agricultural employees are selected (Table 2).
There are various reasons for this decision. The first is that before 1989
only employees paid wage tax and no important category of the self-em-
ployed existed.4 The second is that, as the tax amounts are imputed by
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not included in the statistical survey. Under the previous regime, contributions to social and
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TABLE 1 Characteristics of Income Surveys
Characteristic 1988 1996 2002
Targeted percentage of households 2 1 0.25
Survey sample (no. of households) 69,912 27,314 7,678
Non-response rate in percentage of households 4.2 23.8 28.2
Disposable income per capita (thousands CZK yearly) according to:
– income surveysa 22.3 63.5 92.9
– aggregate statisticsb 25.9 83.5 122.4
Coverage of income surveys in comparison to aggregate statistics
86.1 76.0 75.9
Notes: a Income per capita is weighted by persons.
b Data of the Balance of Incomes and Expenditures of the Population in 1988 and National Accounts in
1996 and 2002.
Sources: Microcensus surveys; Statistical Yearbooks; Czech National Bankstatisticians, there is no such distortion of results as that in the case of
the self-employed, who largely use the possibility to deduct various costs
from the tax base. No evidence of deductions is available in income surveys.
Inclusion of the self-employed – provided we would have “true” data – would
certainly diminish the overall tax burden but probably not strengthen its
progressivity.
The other concepts are shaped in the following way:
– Income decile groups are formed by ranking according to equivalized
household disposable income using the square root of the number of per-
sons in the household weighted by household size. This kind of adjust-
ment corresponds to the OECD approach, taking into account economies
of scale to a reasonable degree (Förster, 2004).
– Only direct taxes were considered, i.e. wage tax in 1988 and personal in-
come tax together with mandatory contributions to health and social in-
surance paid by employees in 1996 and 2002. Relative tax is computed
as the percentage of tax and contributions in gross household income.
– Social benefits are computed without pension benefits. Relative benefits
are computed as the percentage of social benefits in net household in-
come.
– The summary effect is computed as social benefits minus taxes and con-
tributions in percentages of gross household income.5
– When comparing the reduction of gross household income by taxes and
benefits (see Table 3), the gross household income encompasses gross
wages and other earnings, family benefits and pensions.
For the cross-country comparison analysis presented in the third section
of the paper, we were bound by the rules adopted by the OECD and the Eu-
ropean Community Household Panel (ECHP) calculations:
– For the OECD comparison, the population is that of working age, which
was set as 18–64 years of age. Again, decile groups are formed by rank-
ing according to equivalized household disposable income using the squa-
re root of the number of persons in the household and weighted by house-
hold size. Social benefits are computed as family transfer income not
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TABLE 2 Characteristics of Samples Used (incomes per household in thousand current CZK yearly)
Characteristic All households Employee households
1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002
Number of households (thousand)a 3,805 3,822 4,054 2,514 2,117 2,009
Number of persons (thousand)a 10,155 10,182 10,117 7,569 6,518 5,665
Gross earnings  52,7 161,1 212,2 70,6 227,2 308,8
Personal income tax 8,8 17,6 23,9 12,6 23,6 32,4
Social and health insurance 
contributions (persons only) – 16,5 20,6 – 26,6 36,5
Social benefits (without pension benefits) 5,1 9,4 15,0 6,8 12,0 15,5
Pension benefits 10,5 32,6 49,4 4,9 12,0 18,1
Disposable household income  59,5 169,0 232,1 69,7 200,8 273,5
Note: a figures after re-weighting for the entire Czech population
Source: Microcensus surveys
5 In fact, our “summary effect” is just a mirror figure of the average effective tax rate (AETR),
as has been calculated by many authors.including pension benefits. The summary effect (benefits minus taxes) is
calculated from means in deciles.
– For the comparison based on ECHP data, all households were included,
due to the limited availability of more specified data for other countries.
Household income for computing deciles is adjusted to an equivalent unit,
which is computed according to the modified OECD equivalence scale and
weighted by persons. The summary effect is computed as benefits (in-
cluding pensions in this particular case) minus taxes and contributions
in percentages of gross household income.
For estimating the distributional effect of various tax reform proposals,
we made the following additional selections and adaptations:
– From non-agricultural employees’ households, only those were selected
where there are at least one and at most three economically active per-
sons; the reason for this is that only three persons could be fully identi-
fied regarding their earnings.
– Household income for computing deciles is gross income before tax and
contributions.
–T o avoid any bias of computations, households must have non-zero income
from earnings and zero income from self-employment. The sub-sample is
thus smaller than in cross-time comparison; concretely speaking, it
amounts to 1,877 thousand households, which equals 46 percent of all
households and 68 percent of households with economically active persons.
– The “bracket creep” (the fact that with rising nominal income, unchanged
policies lead to a rise in the tax burden over time) is not taken into ac-
count.
– No indexation for income increase after 2002 is made.
2. Changes in Relative Taxes and Benefits
The systems of redistribution before and after 1989 differ greatly. Ave-
rage taxation in employee households rose by about five percentage points
from 1988 to 1996. The new system made taxation steeper. While the tax
for the lowest decile changed only very little, the tax for the top decile in-
creased by 8 percentage points up to one-quarter of gross income (Table 3).
In another perspective, while in 1988 households belonging to the top quin-
tile paid one-third of all taxes, this figure had already reached 41 percent
in 1996 and 43 percent in 2002 (Table 4). Compared to the earlier system,
which was extremely flat, taxation turned more progressive. This occurred
despite the fact that the majority of the population fall within the two low-
est income-tax brackets.
Between 1988 and 2002, the share of transfer income (not including pen-
sion benefits) in the net income of employee households decreased by about
five percentage points. Due to targeting introduced by the reform of social
benefits in the mid-1990s, the new distribution of transfer income is much
more differentiated now than it was before 1990. Starting from the second
income decile households were increasingly hit by benefit reductions. While
the lowest quintile received one-quarter of all transfer income in 1988, this
share rose to more than one-third in both 1996 and 2002. In contrast, thetop
6 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 1-2quintile in 1996 and 2002 received less than one-third of its previous share.
This change is also due to the changing demographic composition of upper-
-income categories, in which there are fewer children.
Due to these two opposing shifts, the summary effect of redistribution
was considerably boosted. The total “net loss” of employee households has
tripled. While in 1988 the lower third of households were the net recipients
of income transferred from the upper half, in 1996 and 2002 only the bot-
tom decile gained. At the other end of the income ladder, the net tax bur-
den doubled. The difference in percentage points between the bottom and
top deciles increased from 27 in 1988 to 43 in 1996 and 45 in 2002. Due
both to tax progressiveness and the targeting of benefits, the degree of re-
distribution according to relative income has intensified.
Obviously, incomes after redistribution are much more equitable than be-
fore redistribution, and as a result the system after 1990 has a stronger
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TABLE 3 Average Taxes, Social Benefits and Their Summary Effect by Income Deciles (%)
Income Taxes Social benefits Summary effect
decile 1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002
1 10.9 12.1 11.9 24.0 26.0 26.0 10.4 10.7 11.0
2 12.1 14.7 14.3 21.0 17.6 16.3 6.3 0.4 -0.2
3 13.1 15.9 15.5 17.3 13.7 13.0 1.9 -4.4 -4.5
4 13.8 17.0 16.7 14.9 10.2 9.2 -1.0 -8.6 -9.0
5 14.3 17.9 17.9 13.0 7.7 6.5 -3.1 -11.5 -12.6
6 14.9 18.8 18.4 11.2 6.3 5.7 -5.3 -13.7 -13.7
7 15.2 19.6 19.4 9.6 4.7 4.5 -7.0 -15.9 -15.8
8 15.7 20.3 20.0 8.0 3.8 4.2 -9.0 -17.3 -16.6
9 16.4 21.6 21.9 6.7 2.4 2.3 -10.8 -19.7 -20.1
10 16.9 24.5 25.2 4.9 1.4 1.3 -12.8 -23.4 -24.2
Total 14.8 19.7 19.7 11.5 7.0 6.6 -5.0 -14.1 -14.4
Ratio H:L 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.1 3.7 3.9 – – –
Notes: Only households of non-agricultural employees are included. Household income is adjusted to an equiva-
lent unit, which is computed as the square root of the number of persons and weighted by persons. Relative
tax is computed as the percentage of income tax and social contributions in gross household income. Rela-
tive social benefits are computed as the percentage of social benefits in net household income. The sum-
mary effect is computed as benefits minus taxes in gross household income and calculated from means in
deciles.
Source: Microcensus surveys
TABLE 4 Shares of Taxes and Social Benefits by Deciles (%)
Income Taxes Social benefits Summary effect
decile 1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002
1 3.9 2.8 2.8 11.6 18.3 19.9 -11.1 -3.4 -3.6
2 5.8 4.5 4.3 13.3 16.0 15.6 -9.0 -0.2 0.1
3 7.1 5.6 5.4 12.3 14.2 14.0 -3.0 2.2 2.1
4 8.2 6.6 6.6 11.5 11.5 11.2 1.8 4.6 4.9
5 9.1 7.6 7.5 10.8 9.4 8.2 5.9 6.9 7.2
6 10.1 8.9 8.8 9.8 8.6 8.2 10.7 9.1 9.0
7 11.0 10.4 10.3 8.9 7.0 7.1 15.1 11.8 11.5
8 12.3 12.2 11.8 7.9 6.3 7.4 20.9 14.5 13.4
9 14.2 15.1 15.5 7.3 4.6 4.6 27.9 19.3 19.5
10 18.1 26.3 27.2 6.6 4.1 3.7 40.8 35.2 36.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: See Table 3.
Source: Microcensus surveysequalizing effect than before. However, because gross (market) household
income is now more differentiated, resulting disposable income distribution
is less equal than it was at the end of the communist regime (Table 5). While
in 1988 households that fell into the lowest income decile had only about
5 percent higher relative income after transfers, the increase amounted to
11 percent in both 1996 and 2002.
Not only disparities in taxation and benefits have shifted, but the factors
determining them have changed too, and therefore, so has the whole struc-
ture of redistribution. The regression analysis in Table 6 measures the ef-
fect of variables such as household income and the size and composition of
households. Owing to the multicolinearity (particularly between the num-
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TABLE 5 Household Income before Redistribution (Market) and after Redistribution (Disposable)
(%)
Income 1998 1996 2002
decile Market Disposable Market Disposable Market Disposable
1 53.3 55.7 45.2 49.4 46.3 50.8
2 70.9 73.2 60.1 63.9 59.3 63.3
3 80.7 82.3 69.3 72.6 68.2 71.8
4 88.2 89.3 76.1 78.6 77.6 80.5
5 94.7 95.3 84.0 85.9 82.4 84.2
6 100.7 100.6 93.6 94.6 93.7 95.2
7 107.5 107.0 104.6 104.7 104.5 104.9
8 116.2 115.0 118.0 117.0 116.4 116.0
9 128.8 126.5 137.9 134.6 139.1 135.3
10 159.1 155.2 211.4 198.7 213.1 198.5
Average 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Only households of non-agricultural employees are included. Household income is adjusted to an equiva-
lent unit, which is computed as the square root of the number of persons and weighted by persons.
Source: Microcensus surveys
TABLE 6 Regression Analysis of Relative Taxes and Social Benefits
Factor Taxes Social benefits Summary effect
1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002 1988 1996 2002
Pearson correlation coefficients:
Household income 0.82 0.92 0.89 0.17 -0.12 -0.11 -0.43 -0.85 -0.81
No. of active earners 0.66 0.40 0.44 0.11 -0.14 -0.08 -0.38 -0.40 -0.41
No. of children -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.76 0.38 0.40 0.56 0.18 0.15
Age of the head 0.14 0.13 0.09 -0.38 -0.29 -0.17 -0.35 -0.21 -0.17
Standardized regression coefficients:
Household income 0.76 0.96 0.90 0.04* -0.12 -0.13 -0.49 -0.88 -0.82
No. of active earners 0.16 -0.06 -0.01* 0.02* -0.04 -0.01* -0.10 -0.04 0.00*
No. of children -0.27 -0.08 -0.08 0.72 0.54 0.40 0.67 0.25 0.21
Age of the head -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05* -0.02* -0.04* 0.02*
R2 0.74 0.85 0.80 0.58 0.35 0.18 0.62 0.78 0.70
Notes: Only households of non-agricultural employees included. Household income is not adjusted and not weighted
by persons. Relative tax is computed as the percentage of income tax and social contributions in gross house-
hold income. Relative social benefits are computed as the percentage of social benefits in net household in-
come. The summary effect is computed as benefits minus taxes in percentages of gross household income.
All coefficients except those marked by * are significant at the level <0.001.
Source: Microcensus surveysber of wage earners and household income) the results must be viewed with
reservation.
Regarding taxes, the new system stresses the effect of original (gross)
household income and diminishes the effect of the number of active earn-
ers and children. In fact, only household income remained important for
the amount of tax and contributions after 1989. Although tax allowances
for dependent children have been retained, their effect is suppressed by
mandatory insurance contributions, which are simply derived from ear-
nings. Indeed, if income tax alone is regressed the same way, the stan-
dardized regression coefficient for the number of children increases to -0.12
and for the number of economically active members to -0.11.
Important changes have also occurred in the case of social benefits. While
before 1989 they had no relationship to family income and were determined
solely by the number of children, the effect of targeting is apparent in 1996
and even more so in 2002. While the strength of the determination of over-
all taxing remained almost the same and that of the determination of trans-
fer income decreased substantially, regression analyses of the summary ef-
fect suggest the same degree of determination with a completely different
structure: while the effect of household income almost doubled, the effect
of the number of children was reduced to about one third.
3. Taxes and Benefits in OECD Countries
In the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe the extent of
the overall redistribution has substantially decreased in connection with
the market transition and economic reforms. In the former Czechoslovakia
the rate of redistribution as a percentage of GDP was estimated at 70 per-
cent, in Hungary and Poland at 50–60 percent (Newbery, 1995). Economic
reforms contracted the tax quota up to (or below) 40 percent in all of these
countries (OECD, 2004). The Czech tax structure has several specific fea-
tures (Bronchi – Burns, 2000). Compared with the EU average, personal
income tax is rather low in the Czech Republic, but contributions to social
and health insurance are high.
Taken separately, the national systems of taxes and benefits differ con-
siderably. Therefore, it is not easy to grasp the summary redistributive ef-
fect on household income. Furthermore, the approach and the methods also
matter. Most often, the so-called model family or typological approach is
used, where the redistributive effect of taxes and social benefits is calcu-
lated for household situations according to typical family composition and
average wage level. In OECD tax equations an industrial worker with
an average wage is used as the starting point, with variations in the family
situation, such as economic activity, spouse’s earnings, and the number of
children.6
A better approach, one closer to reality, is based on representative sur-
veys. Such types of comparative analyses have been conducted or commis-
sioned by the OECD. In one method local experts compiled standardized ta-
bles based on national income surveys (Förster, 2000), (Förster – d’Ercole,
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tive flows comparatively, taking advantage of the databases of national in-
come surveys archived and standardized in the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) (Atkinson – Rainwater – Smeeding, 1995), (Ervik, 1998). The data of
theEuropeanCommunityHouseholdPanel(ECHP) was used by EUROMOD
staff in the same way (Immervoll, 2002).
Here we are using two main sources for comparison. The first is the last
OECD study in which Czech data also appeared for the first time (Förster
– d’Ercole, 2004). Thesecond is thedatabase of ECHPdata available through
the EUROMOD database. In both cases, we computed the Czech figures us-
ing data from the Microcensus 2002.
Table 7 presents the distribution of taxes and benefits among the work-
ing age population in selected OECD countries by quintiles. There are some
countries where taxation of thebottom income quintile is close to zero, which
makes the steepness of taxation extreme – this is in liberal countries such
as the USA, the UK and Ireland, but also even in “welfarist” Belgium. At
the other end of income distribution, liberal and “welfarist” countries con-
verge – the top income quintile of households pays about 55 percent of all
taxes and contributions in France and 57 percent in the USA. The Czech
Republic ranks among the countries where the relative burden of the top
quintile is large, though not the biggest of all the countries. Alongside the li-
beral countries, similar shares are also exhibited by Italy and, to a slightly
lesser extent, Germany.
The distribution of benefits is generally much flatter than that of taxes,
with the exception of the UK. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic displays
quite high targeting in the bottom income quintile, which takes up 42 of all
non-pension benefits. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, while in
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TABLE 7 Distribution of Taxes and Social Benefits in Selected OECD Countries by Income 
Quintiles around 2000 (%)
Country Taxes Social benefits
bottom six middle top ratio bottom six middle top ratio
quintile deciles quintile 3:1 quintile deciles quintile 4:6
12 3 456
Czech Republic 3.6 48.2 48.2 13.4 42.3 50.1 7.6 5.6
Austria . . . . 28.8 59.7 11.5 2.5
Belgium (1995) 1.3 49.4 49.3 37.9 27.4 59.4 13.2 2.1
France 7.0 37.6 55.3 7.9 33.5 56.3 10.2 3.3
Germany 3.3 52.1 44.6 13.5 28.0 56.6 15.4 1.8
Ireland 2.0 50.4 47.6 23.8 34.2 55.1 10.6 3.2
Italy 3.3 47.7 48.9 14.8 20.8 57.9 21.2 1.0
Hungary . . . . 25.5 56.7 17.8 1.4
Netherlands 5.8 54.2 39.9 6.9 47.1 45.6 7.4 6.4
Sweden 6.1 52.8 41.2 6.8 33.0 55.7 11.4 2.9
UK 2.5 48.1 49.5 19.8 62.2 35.5 2.4 25.9
USA 1.8 41.1 57.1 31.7 33.6 50.9 15.5 2.2
Notes: Households with head in working age, set at 18–64 years of age. Household income is adjusted to an equiva-
lent unit, which is computed as the square root of the number of persons and weighted by persons.
Source: (Förster – d’Ercole, 2004)other countries the distribution of transfers is much more equal across
the income ladder. In Belgium and Germany, and also in Hungary and
the USA, the top quintile receives a high share, reaching 18 percent in
the case of Hungary and 21 percent in the case of Italy.
In Table 8, only the summary measure is compared across countries and
by income deciles. It is here again defined as social benefits (also including
non-private pension benefits) minus income tax and contributions for health
and social insurance in percentages of gross household income. The inclu-
sion of the whole of the population makes the calculation incomparable with
the above Tables 3 and 4. The figures for old member countries were cal-
culated from the ECHP database, and we added Czech data calculated us-
ing the 2002 Microcensus.
From this perspective the Czech system appears less redistributive than
those in other countries. While Czech figures regarding the upper half of
income distribution are quite similar to the EU-15 average, there are im-
portant differences regarding the bottom half of income distribution: those
households are net recipients in most countries (and the EU-15 average),
but in the Czech Republic they are net payers, starting from the fourth
decile. The country is located between “socialist” France, where most house-
holds appear as net recipients and the taxation of the upper income decile
is the lowest among the EU countries, and “socialist” Sweden, where most
households are net payers and the taxation of the upper income decile is
the highest.
The overall balance of redistribution through taxes, contributions and
benefits is also telling. The Czech Republic is among the countries where
the “burden” of households is substantially higher than their “benefits” –
together with the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. In the EU-15 ave-
rage and in most countries the surplus is much lower, or even negative, as
in France, Austria and Ireland. Apparently, there is no exact affiliation of
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TABLE 8 Summary Effect of Redistribution by Income Deciles in Selected EU Countries around
2000 (%)
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Czech
Republic
40.8 9.8 0.5 -4.2 -5.9 -9.2 -13.1 -15.3 -17.5 -22.7 -10.1
Austria 158.6 64.5 41.3 27.0 5.3 6.8 -1.4 -8.4 -14.6 -14.8 2.7
Belgium 287.8 107.4 42.5 17.4 0.9 -12.1 -17.4 -24.9 -28.8 -34.7 -12.7
France 96.0 63.3 38.3 27.7 22.4 11.0 5.6 2.4 -0.2 -13.6 6.8
Germany 190.4 70.4 31.0 24.6 4.4 -5.7 -11.2 -13.4 -23.2 -27.5 -7.2
Ireland 999.9 361.4 124.9 53.3 28.0 3.5 -3.4 -9.4 -16.1 -25.4 1.0
Italy 40.9 68.7 34.4 23.5 16.8 12.5 3.5 -2.0 -8.8 -16.7 0.3
Nether-
lands
122.5 75.0 22.3 -0.1 -7.4 -13.6 -16.1 -18.9 -21.9 -28.8 -12.0
Sweden 97.1 119.1 71.9 10.8 -3.1 -12.0 -15.9 -21.6 -26.2 -34.8 -11.2
UK 368.8 164.2 87.6 39.3 12.4 1.1 -10.4 -16.7 -20.8 -27.2 -5.5
EU-15 69.2 73.3 58.1 37.1 19.2 6.1 -3.5 -10.0 -16.8 -23.8 -3.6
Notes: All households included. Household income is adjusted to anequivalent unit, which is computed as thesquare
root of the number of persons and weighted by persons. The summary effect is computed as benefits (in-
cluding pensions in this particular case) minus taxes in percentages of gross household income.
Source: (EUROMOD, 2001) – author’s own computationsresults to “welfare state regimes” – as they are used in the literature after
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) coining the term – and the data also appeals for
control of survey data with statistical aggregates.
4. Distributional Effect of Tax Reforms
In previous sections, we dealt with the joint effect of the tax and insuran-
ce contributions system on the one hand, and the income transfer through
social benefits on the other hand. Now we are focusing on the personal in-
come tax only, as reform proposals do not cover other redistribution chan-
nels (insurance contributions, benefits of the state social support scheme).
As noted above, a particular feature of the Czech system is the high rate of
contributions to social and health insurance. While personal income tax
amounted to 12 percent of governmental revenue (about the same as the
percentage of corporate tax), contributions of employees and employers
amounted to 35 percent in 2003 (Statistical Yearbook of the CR 2004).
When speaking about income inequality, however, we have to take into
account that while insurance contributions are arranged as a flat-rate tax
(moreover, with no ceilings so far), personal income tax is shaped progres-
sively. Consequently, the weight of both of these in explaining the ratio of
household disposable income to its gross market income is about the same
but still lower than the effect of social benefits, where distribution is much
steeper. There are also important interaction effects we should control in
the analysis – the charges of taxes and insurance contributions are ba-
lanced by the positive effect of their interaction.
Taking the issue generally, tax reforms could proceed in various ways.
The main possibilities are:
– redefinition (mostly an increase) of the zero rate band,
– redefinition of other rate bands by narrowing or expanding them,
– setting different tax rates in selected or all tax bands,
– changing the tax allowances deductible from taxable income, i.e. before
the amount of tax payable is calculated,
– introducing or changing tax credits deductible from resulting tax, i.e. af-
ter the amount of tax is calculated,
– introducing or changing premiums, such as the “child bonus”, as a re-
fundable tax offset,
– introducing or changing the negative income tax (NIT) as a social bene-
fit to replace or complement other transfer income among low-income
households.
In 2005 several proposals for the reform of personal income tax were put
forth. The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) wants to challenge the currently
blurred system by considerably simplifying it and setting a flat-rate tax of
15 percent. Countering this, the government, led by the Czech Social Demo-
cratic Party (âSSD) and voiced by the Minister of Finance, Bohuslav
Sobotka, has proposed reducing tax in the two lowest bands and replacing
deductible allowances with direct tax credits. The governmental proposal
was finally enacted and is in force as of the beginning by 2006.
The overview of reforms is presented in Table 9. Only the current go-
vernmental reform is described in full detail. The ODS flat-rate tax pro-
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between the taxpayer, his/her partner and children. Also, the negative in-
come tax (NIT) could be specified – here we defined it uniformly at a level
60 percent, according to the Blue Chance programme. The variant of tax al-
lowances we apply was quoted by the ODS’s shadow Finance Minister, Vlas-
timil Tlust˘, as the most probable combination in an interview on Czech
Radio broadcast on 12 June 2005.
Using definitions, we applied the proposals to the Microcensus 2002
dataset, more specifically to a sub-sample of employee households described
in section 1 of the article. To avoid any bias in the computations, households
had to have non-zero income from earnings and zero income from self-em-
ployment. The sub-sample is thus smaller than reported in Table 2 speci-
fically it amounts to 1,877 thousand households, which equals 46 percent
of all households and 68 percent of households with economically active per-
sons. As no indexation of incomes was made, bracket creep is not taken into
13 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 1-2
TABLE 9 Tax Reform Proposals for Personal Income Tax: An Overview (CZK yearly)
Taxable income from To Percent From tax base
over Bonus/NIT
2004 (current state)
0 109,200 15 %
109,200 218,400 16,380 + 20 % 109,200
218,400 331,200 38,220 + 25 % 218,400





2005 (child credit and bonus)
0 109,200 15 %
109 200 218,400 16,380 + 20 % 109,200
218 400 331,200 38,220 + 25 % 218,400
331 200 66,420 + 32 % 331,200
Tax allowance for
payer 38,040
wife 21,720 bonus 6,000
child – tax credit 6,000 per child
2006 (governmental reform)
0 121,200 12 %
121 200 218,400 14,544 + 19 % 121,200
218 400 331,200 33,012 + 25 % 218,400
331 200 61,212 + 32 % 331,200
Tax credits for
payer 7,200
wife 4,200 bonus 6,000
child 6,000 per child
ODS 1 (flat rate tax 15 %, SIC 8 % removed, no NIT)
Tax allowance for No NIT
payer 72,000
child 24,000
ODS 2 (flat rate tax 15%, SIC 8% removed, NIT included)
Tax allowance for NIT 60 %
payer 72,000
child 24,000account in the computations, nor is behavioral change. The deciles are com-
puted on the basis of total earned household income; no weighting by per-
sons or equivalence units is applied.
In Tables 10 and 11, we first show the averages of personal income tax
and then the distribution of overall tax collected. For comparison, the situ-
ation in 2004 (but still on 2002 income data) is taken as a benchmark. Then
the new arrangement introduced in 2005 is shown, with the tax credit and
bonus for children. The estimates of tax distribution following the use of
three other variants of the tax reform are presented in the remaining
columns.
All reform proposals should lead to a decrease in the tax burden, the most
radical being acombination of theflat tax and thenegative income tax (NIT)
for the lowest categories. This variant is also the most advantageous for
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TABLE 10 Reform Proposals: Tax Averages by Deciles of Household Gross Income (%)
Income 2004 2005 2006 ODS 1 ODS 2
decile (15 %) (NIT)
1 2.7 2.6 1.1 1.6 -10.9
2 5.5 5.3 2.9 4.2 2.4
3 6.4 5.9 4.5 5.3 4.5
4 7.2 6.8 5.4 5.9 5.6
5 7.5 7.1 5.4 5.3 5.3
6 8.3 7.8 6.6 5.5 5.5
7 8.5 8.1 6.7 5.5 5.5
8 9.5 9.2 8.0 6.6 6.6
9 10.7 10.5 9.8 8.0 8.0
10 14.5 14.5 14.7 10.3 10.3
Average 9.8 9.5 8.6 7.0 6.4
Notes: Only households of non-agricultural employees with at least one and at most three economically active per-
sons are included. Households must have non-zero income from earnings and zero income from self-em-
ployment. The bracket creep and possibility of joint taxation of couples are not taken into account and no in-
dexation for income increase after 2002 is made. Household income for computing deciles is defined as gross
labor income before tax and contributions and it is not weighted by persons.
Source: author’s own computations using the Microcensus 2002 household file
TABLE 11 Reform Proposals: Tax Shares by Deciles of Household Gross Income (%)
Income 2004 2005 2006 ODS 1 ODS 2
decile (15 %) (NIT)
1 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.7 -5.1
2 2.6 2.6 1.6 2.8 1.7
3 3.8 3.5 3.0 4.4 4.0
4 5.1 4.9 4.4 5.8 5.9
5 6.2 6.0 5.1 6.2 6.6
6 8.1 7.7 7.1 7.5 8.1
7 9.5 9.3 8.5 8.5 9.3
8 12.4 12.4 12.0 12.0 13.1
9 16.7 16.9 17.5 17.4 18.9
10 34.7 35.9 40.5 34.7 37.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
RH Index 33.8 35.2 30.0 34.1 39.7
Note: See Table 10.
Source: author’s own computations using the Microcensus 2002 household filehouseholds in the first decile, which should be the largest recipient of con-
tributions from NIT benefits. There are also marked differences at the top
of income distribution. While the 2005 change and governmental reform do
not bring any benefit to the tenth decile (and only a small benefit to
the deciles below it), the ODS proposals bring a substantial advantage of
up to five percentage points for the top decile.
In Table 12, we display the effect of various tax proposals in income dis-
tribution in absolute terms. First, we show the absolute gain/loss in the in-
dividual deciles of the “original” gross household income. There is a diffe-
rence between governmental reform, which is more advantageous for lower
income categories, and the ODS proposals where the profit increases with
increasing income.
However, none of the proposed reforms has a substantial effect on income
distribution. Differences in resulting income inequality are indeed negligi-
ble. The reason is that the amount of personal income tax relative to house-
hold income is too small. Despite the fact that some amounts may appear
large, they are rather small relative to the total amount of household in-
come. The maximum profit could reach 5 percent of disposable income, as
is the case in the first decile after introducing NIT or in the tenth decile in
the ODS proposals.
5. Conclusion
The change brought about by the complex reform of taxation and benefit
provision in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s has been substantial and
has various aspects. Owing to the lack of transparency of redistribution un-
der the command economy, comparisons with the pre-1989 situation are in-
complete. Within the limits of information available (only partial for
the communist period) it may be said that the state takes more from and
gives less to households. In comparison with the situation before 1989,
the redistributive effect of the new system is also much stronger.
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TABLE 12 Resulting Increase of Disposable Household Income (CZK)
Income Original 2005 2006 ODS 1 ODS 2
decile 2004 (15 %) (NIT)
1 108,849 77 2,556 1,965 5,351
2 151,981 233 2,660 2,013 5,451
3 181,239 526 3,517 2,642 4,932
4 205,583 982 3,865 3,708 5,683
5 231,309 1,097 4,637 5,314 7,448
6 256,777 1,310 4,894 6,810 7,993
7 286,332 1,368 5,338 8,795 9,490
8 322,950 875 4,264 9,230 9,595
9 373,536 983 3,964 12,239 12,285
10 552,314 -145 -1,041 27,286 27,452
Total 266,950 708 3,444 8,011 9,548
Note: See Table 10.
Source: author’s own computations using the Microcensus 2002 household fileThe progression of taxes and transfers greatly weakens the disparities of
market income. Nevertheless, theresulting distribution of disposable house-
hold income is still much less equal than it was before 1990. The situations
in 1996 and 2002 are quite similar, which corresponds to the maintenance
of the tax and benefit system. However, the reduction of income inequality
through redistribution is slightly stronger in 2002 compared to 1996. This
may be a consequence of the lower number of children in families.
When comparing cross-nationally, the outcome depends on the source and
the method. Taking taxes and benefits separately, we can say that the Czech
state levies taxes on upper-income households substantially but not ex-
tremely, and that the targeting of benefits to low-income families is also
very narrow, although not the narrowest. When computing a summary mea-
sure, the Czech system appears less redistributive than those in other coun-
tries. While Czech figures for the upper half of income distribution are quite
similar to the EU-15 average, there are important differences in the bot-
tom half of income distribution: those households are net recipients in
the EU-15 average but in the Czech Republic they are net payers.
Personal income tax reforms can affect overall redistribution flows only
to a very limited degree, as it corresponds to the weight of the tax in over-
all flows and taxing and transfers. All proposals aim to reduce the tax bur-
den, in particular for lower income categories. While the “leftist” proposals
proceed by means of an increase in tax progression in the name of social
solidarity, the “rightist” proposals want to keep taxation for middle and up-
per income categories flat for the sake of work motivation. However, if a flat
tax were combined with the negative income tax, the resulting distance be-
tween the burdens of the bottom and the upper income decile categories
might indeed be great.
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SUMMARY 
JEL classification: H24, D31
Keywords: Czech Republic; redistribution of income; social benefits; tax system
Income Taxes and Benefits among Czech Employees
Changes since 1989 and a Cross-National Comparison
Jiří VEČERNÍK – Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Prague (Jiri.Vecernik@soc.cas.cz)
Statistical income surveys are used to show the separate and joint effects of taxes
and transfers on the distribution of household income among employees in the Czech
Republic. On the face of it, the state takes more from and gives less to households.
Compared with the situation before 1989, the redistributive effect of the new system
is much stronger. In a cross-national comparison, the results depend on the sources
and the methods used. When taxes and benefits are taken separately, it can be said
that the Czech state taxes upper-income households considerably, but not to an ex-
treme extent, and that the targeting of benefits to low-income families is narrow,
though not the narrowest. When a summary measure is applied, the Czech system
appears to be no more redistributive than those of other countries. It is found that
personal income tax reforms affect redistribution flows only to a very limited degree.
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